ABSTRACT: Recent events impel us to rethink fundamentals: to bring political economy, historical materialist theory, state theory, and the theory of nations and national consciousness together, and to bear on the core questions: How mature is world capitalism today? What stadial SS stagetheoretic SS elements must be invoked to explain the present? A rigorous stadial approach to capitalist evolution suggests that, contrary to much popular wisdom, capitalism=s conquest of the world is far from complete. This understanding does not mechanically postpone significant social transformation; to the contrary, it points toward the possibility of getting a better fix on what is possible in the short term, so as to bring longer range goals into clearer focus and relevance.
way perhaps not done for many decades. This essay is intended as a contribution to that reexamination.
The project is vast, and no single individual or school of thought can encompass it all. It brings together critical, humanist, revolutionary, and scientific streams of thought SS AMarxist@ still seems to be the best available adjective for the unity of these perspectives SS in the search for a way to get beyond capitalist power and world domination, and to realize the untapped human potential for creativity, solidarity, and growth.
The next section will collect some of the ingredients for this project. The following section will outline a new stadial SS stage-theoretic SS analysis of the present moment, drawing on historical materialism and political economy in what I propose are novel ways. The goal is a sounder approach to the questions: How mature is capitalism at present? How does today=s world reflect the degree of development of the dominant SS capitalist SS mode of production and of the potential and actual forces for its transcendence? The final, concluding, section draws some tentative lessons and points to directions for further inquiry.
I. INGREDIENTS FOR A REVITALIZED MARXIST
ANALYSIS OF THE PRESENT Thinking about the Marxist tradition from the standpoint of the present reveals significant weaknesses. In the Soviet Union and its allied states, Marxist social science had the resources of state power and official status at its disposal; this made possible a mature academic practice and a highly articulated Anormal science,@ which produced a large amount of data, empirical research, and significant scholarly output (including definitive editions and annotations of the classical Marxist texts). The downside, as is well known, was the authoritarian politicization of academic and scholarly life and a failure to distinguish between popular and scientific levels of discourse which, together with deeply entrenched bureaucratism, generated dogmatic and Ascriptural@ approaches to Marxist theory.
In capitalist countries outside of the Communist political environment, Marxism faced a different set of challenges. Principal among these, perhaps, has been a tendency to succumb to a certain impatience and foreshortening of time projections that understandably arises from lack of practical experience with political leadership and social construction on a large scale. In addition, AWestern@ Marxism, owing to its increasing confinement to the academy, has made inordinate concessions to the disciplinary boundaries and specializations that have evolved in the universities since the mid-19th century.
Against this background, I identify four essential problem areas for the revitalization project: re-envisioning of time; the role of theory; transcending arbitrary separations and specializations; and, finally, reconceptualizing stages, and the stadial principle, in thinking about social evolution and the place of the present in that evolution.
Time: Foreshortening, Condensation
For Aofficial@ reasons in the East and Autopian@ ones in the West, Marxists have repeatedly compressed the time line for social change. If we are to pose in a newly rigorous way the question, How mature is world capitalism today?, this problem must be faced. It began in the late 1840s, when the young Marx and Engels saw the democratic uprisings throughout Europe as heralding imminent proletarian revolution. It continued into the 20th century, with Lenin=s Ahighest and last stage@ formulation, and persists in the sting carried by the standard critique from mainstream liberal circles SS Awhere is this revolutionary workingclass movement that Marx projected?@ The Frankfurt School took shape in an attempt to Aexplain@ the Aabsence@ of proletarian revolution in the West; the complexity of the requirements for revolutionary class agency in advanced capitalist countries is also a central axis of Gramsci=s thought (Jay, 1973; Gramsci, 1992; Cammett, 1967) . Georg Luk cs scandalized the Hungarian officialdom of the 1950s by saying: AIt took six centuries to get from feudalism to capitalism; so it will take six decades to get from capitalism to socialism.@ All of this reveals an important shared assumption: transcendence of capitalism will (or will not) take place in a greatly foreshortened time span SS perhaps even within Aour@ lifetime (or so Marx predicted and so his theory presumably requires).
But we must be clear about this. There is simply no reason to assume any preordained time frame for social change. The drive to accumulate and innovate under the pressure of competition produces a sense of an increased rate of change under capitalism, as compared with precapitalist social formations; thus Marx= and Engels= praise for the bourgeoisie, which Aduring its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together@ (Marx and Engels, 1998, 10) ; thus also Lukacs= quip. On the other hand, socialist revolution is not just replacement of one form of class exploitation with another but transcendence of class exploitation as such. This most complex of all social transitions therefore pursues political power on a society-wide scale prior to decisive transformation of the production relations (Aptheker, 1960) . Capitalist market relations have a Atotalizing@ quality, like a gas expanding to fill the entire social space they inhabit; they therefore require a revolutionary political movement that is capable of envisioning alternative social relations.
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This perspective explains why socialism (to use the term that has come into common use) has had any number of failed or protracted embodiments, beginning with the Paris Commune, and continuing with the Russian and Chinese revolutions, the associated transformations in Eastern Europe and Asia, the Cuban Revolution, various forms of Anoncapitalist@ development in Africa, and even such cooperative movements as Mondragon in 1
In its opposition to Atotalizing@ narratives, postmodernism deprives us (in its own peculiar Atotalizing@ manner) of the opportunity to confront the spontaneous, implicit and structural totality of capitalist social relations and power (see Gonz lez, 2004 the Basque provinces of Spain. These historical moments should not be regarded as Afalse starts@ (this term handily conveys the sense of one-time, apocalyptic transition that has bedeviled much socialist thinking), but rather as episodes in which experience is harvested, lessons learned, foundations laid. Perspective on this can be derived from the insight that capitalism, in turn, had Afalse starts@ going back thousands of years into the ancient world: the vast systems of trade and finance in several Mediterranean civilizations and references to wage labor (Aservice for hire@) in Aristotle, plus the existence of enclaves of early bourgeois systems of production within many feudal societies, especially on overland trade routes and waterways.
The point is not to replace the mechanical assumption of an accelerating pace of change with its opposite. It is not that the time for decisive transformation is long; it is, rather, incalculable. Once we have a firm grasp on the prerequisites for socialism SS technical, institutional, cultural and ideological SS we can explore the pathways through which those prerequisites mature, without any prior commitment to a time frame derived from a rigid set of evolutionary categories. In particular, there is a process of condensation (the Bolshevik theoreticians spoke of Acombined development@) through which a given maturational step, resting on a long prior history, may be accomplished relatively quickly (in historical time). We need not repeat the errors of some Second International thinking, which used the then-new Marxist concept of social evolution to envision a postponed revolution; but neither should we use the critique of that mechanistic approach to reject the social-evolution problematic as such.
The Role of Theory
It should be clear by now that an appropriate sense of time can be established only by means of a theoretical understanding. While theory has come under attack in recent years, we need to rebuild the theoretical habit SS given suitable caution learned from our long confrontation with non-Marxist thinking and heightened demands for epistemological sophistication. This habit is a simple affirmation: the deep structure of reality is not immediately apparent, and continual bombardment by sense-data and Ainformation@ will not suffice to reveal that structure=s essential properties.
Is this Atheoreticism@? The postmodern impulse, now slightly tarnished but still very much present, warns against hyperextension of the theoretical. The problem is undoubtedly real, and we should certainly avoid Atheory for its own sake.@ Theoreticism, however, is hardly the most pressing problem for the left, in the United States and elsewhere. (One remembers Marx=s comment about the French public, Aalways impatient to come to a conclusion@; Marx, 1967, 21 .) The much more prevalent tendencies are toward empiricism, and sensualism: the overwhelming of thought by the impress of current events and moods. Especially in turbulent times, we need to hone the theoretical faculty, which enables us to Atake a step back@ and look at the present in a framework that offers systematic perspective.
Synthesis: Transcending the Disciplinary Boundaries
A partial list of components crying out for synthesis includes: political economy; the theory of precapitalist formations (and the historical materialist concept-set in general) (Hobsbawm, 1964) ; state theory (Holloway and Picciotto, 1978; Jessop, 1990; Das, 1996) ; and Anation theory@ (study of the territorial/cultural/linguistic unities loosely called nations, or nationalities) (Luxemburg, 1976; Lenin, 1967) . The disciplinary boundaries of academia have not helped here, but the problem runs deeper. Thus, Marxist Aeconomists@ work on the theory of the capitalist Aeconomy@ (itself an abstraction with consequences). Along the spectrum running from theory to policy, those who work at the former end often never Aget around to@ the latter, and have no distinctive opinions on policy issues. Current or topical writers, in turn, reveal, in their failure to use political economy in their work, a more-or-less conscious assumption that the latter has little of use to offer. We experience different Acomfort levels@ working at different levels of abstraction. It is not the existence of this divide that is troublesome; it is, rather, the fact that the divide is accepted unquestioningly, with little effort to overcome it.
Our prime case-in-point is study of the present-day global economy. Many writers in this area draw upon the imperialism and dependency literature without thoroughly confronting it. They also tend to ignore political economy, implicitly asserting, e.g., that Marx=s Capital is at best only marginally relevant to their interests. State theorists often (not invariably) ignore political economy, focusing instead on a different Aproblematic@ SS viz., the nature and extent of the relative autonomy of state managers. Others debate the existence or non-existence of a transnational capitalist class, various fractions of that class, etc., without (again, not invariably) realizing that the international and transnational cannot acquire precise meaning until and unless we have a clear concept of a nation as such. What makes the Anations@ of the capitalist era distinctive, in relation to similar territorialncultural unities from earlier periods? Enough has been said here to establish the main point: the various streams of inquiry must be brought together and to bear on each other, if we are to address the insufficiencies arising in each of them separately.
Stages and the Stadial Principle
Stadial thinking is central to the Marxist tradition; consider, e.g., Marx=s enumeration of Athe Asiatic, the ancient, the feudal and the modern bourgeois@ epochs in world history in the Preface to the Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (Marx, 1904, 13) , or the absoluteSrelative surplus value distinction and the concept of Primitive Accumulation in Capital. Still, it has often been met with suspicion in AWestern@ circles; any talk of stages smacks of determinism SS of a mechanistic presumption that all social formations must pass through them in linear succession, or that the very positing of stages invalidates the role of consciousness and agency in social change. The concept must therefore be developed with great care, especially since the conclusions reached will have major implications for our view of the deep structure of the present.
The Marxist tradition offers a rich variety of approaches here. The Bauer/ Lenin/Hilferding/Kautsky/Bukharin generation proposed a Alate@ stage of capitalism, variously called Aimperialism,@ Afinance capital,@ Amonopoly capital.@ 2 However, the basis for the definitions of stages, or for transitions between them, is not explained. Capital accumulation evidently reaches a point at which the nature of capital shifts from, in some sense, competitive to monopolistic, and its behavior changes from parametric (responding passively to external price signals) to strategic. Lenin (1933) speaks of the fusion of banking capital with industrial capital to form finance capital SS although it is unclear why that fusion could not have taken place decades earlier, what prior conditions made it possible, or why it results in the qualitatively new epoch in world capitalist behavior that he so well describes.
AState-monopoly capitalism@ SS the central concept for the Communist parties in the 20th century and therefore generally ignored or vilified by non-Communist Marxists SS
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Ernest Mandel (Mandel, 1975) popularized the term Alate capitalism,@ which has the advantage of not foreclosing on the principle underlying the earlynlate distinction, but might also be seen as an end run around the need to nail down that principle. In fact, the notion that the current stage is Alate,@ if not the Ahighest@ SS not to mention the other term in common use, Aadvanced capitalism@ SS already contains a conclusion that is not warranted by an underlying theory.
For a useful survey of early 20th century periodization theory, see McDonough, 1995. observes, in relation to the earlier liberal or competitive era, a decisively enhanced role for the state, and a tighter interpenetration between state executives and the representatives of monopoly capital (Kuusinen, 1960; Pevzner, 1984 The AMonthly Review@ or Amonopoly capital@ school has its source in Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy=s Monopoly Capital (1966; see also Foster, 1986) , which drops the Astate@ qualifier (in an explicit move to differentiate itself from Astate monopoly capitalism@). The monopoly stage in this conception is based on the demand constraint and aligns with the stagnationist view: maturing capitalism becomes increasingly prone to stagnation and depression, due to restricted demand (Steindl, 1952; Minsky, 1982) . Also in the Western Marxist camp we find Regulation Theory (Aglietta, 1979; Lipietz, 1987) 3 and the Social Structures of Accumulation model (Bowles, Gordon & Weisskopf, 1983) . These schools propose a succession of regimes of accumulation, or social contracts; Fordism/post-Fordism is a core concept for them (for a useful survey, see Kotz, 1990) . Finally, in a brief summary the position of the Uno School must be mentioned. Uno theorists take their inspiration from the Japanese Marxist Kozo Uno (see Uno, 1980; Itoh, 1980; Sekine, 1975) . They posit three separate levels of inquiry: Principles of the purely capitalist economy; Stage theory; and Historical analysis. The overriding theoretical commitment is to keep these levels separate, whereas Marx, and many others subsequently, tend to slide among them without complete methodological awareness. In this way, the theory of Stages is kept separate from the Apure@ theory of accumulation, as a matter of principle. The stages SS mercantilism, liberalism and imperialism in most formulations SS are thus programmatically deprived of a foundation in theory in the sense that I intend, and remain, therefore, essentially arbitrary and untheorized (see Albritton, et al., 2001 , for a compendium of periodization theories). Other stadial conceptions involve the predominance in one period or another of particular use-values. Thus, railroads, automobiles, the assembly line, electronics, the Ainformation age@ (e.g.,
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At least in the early generation; by the 1990s, many Regulationists had become postMarxist, or had dropped AMarxist@ altogether. Carnoy, et al., 1993) , may each represent a stage of capitalist accumulation. The problem here, of course, is that Astages@ of this sort have no clear relation one to the other, and provide no basis for anticipation of the number and character of stages that might succeed. Once again, explanation is forsaken in favor of historical description, and this gets us no farther forward in our attempt to define the present in stadial terms.
Theoretical Periodization
After that buildup, and despite all of my demurrals and caveats, I had better come up with something different! Section II below presents a preliminary model of stadiality for the capitalist epoch. This model draws upon three elements, explained briefly in this subsection: a) theoretical stages, and theorized transitions between them; b) layered abstractions, and in particular three levels of abstraction that can usefully be distinguished; and, finally, c) capitalist diffusion. This latter was undertheorized by Marx; it should be placed at the same level of abstraction as the much more clearly grasped capitalist accumulation.
a. The theoretical stage and theorized transition. Theoretical stages are to be distinguished from descriptive stages, which are distilled from empirical observation and practice and are an essential step toward identification of theoretical stages. What distinguishes the latter, however, are the necessities that link the stages into a chain, in which each stage requires specific prerequisites from the one preceding; accomplishes specific developmental tasks unique to itself; and lays precise foundations that determine essential characteristics of the succeeding stage. 4 Theoretical stages are stages in the development of a theoretical object, which stands in the usual complex relation to the actual historical process. The paradigmatic case for this distinction is the general theory of social evolution, in which a discrete set of identifiable 4
The term Ateleology@ often surfaces when people are confronted with the concept of theoretical stages; a word may therefore be in order. Teleology is the Afact or character attributed to nature or natural processes of being directed toward an end or shaped by a purpose@ (Webster=s New Collegiate Dictionary), as in the animistic beliefs found in many pre-industrial cultures, or in (some interpretations of) Hegel=s notion of a drive present in partial and inadequate reality toward fulfillment in the Absolute Idea. Nothing of the kind, of course, is invoked in the proposition that objective processes in history (Aprocesses without a subject@) contain stadial properties.
modes of production (e.g., communal, slave, feudal, capitalist, socialist/communist) succeed each other, in that order and only that order, each requiring the preceding and in turn laying required foundations for the following, and each containing an inherent (immanent) contradiction ensuring its progressive insufficiency and eventual replacement. This sequence, however, exists nowhere in real history. History shows only a complex variety of societies in which the various modes of production are intertwined; transitions are combined in character and may be elongated or even thwarted by social, geographical and human-butaccidental external circumstances; and diffusion from one formation to another creates an open-ended (not infinite) variety of combinations, cycles, torch-relay leaps (Semenov, 1980) , even regressions. In particular, there is no presumption that any given evolutionary path, or indeed that of humankind as such, will be completed: there is no guarantee of survival, let alone of fulfillment of potentials perceived in yet-to-appear stages of development.
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Theoretical determinacy at the level of the abstract social totality does not negate the variety and contingency of empirical history; it is in fact conceived as the means by which that variety and contingency can be both preserved and explained.
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Whether or not a compelling account of the capitalist epoch in terms of theoretical stages can be constructed, the existing periodization literature (see Albritton, et al., 2001) does not for the most part meet this criterion. Descriptively rich accounts of economic life in given time periods SS Fordist industrial production, the Age of the Internet, etc.SS clearly do not derive their meaning from any stadial concept-set with the Achain-linked@ property.
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Class conflict Aeach time ended either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes@ (Marx and Engels, 1998 (1848), 2, emphasis added). 6 E.g., Marx, 1967, 19 . For a full explanation and elaboration of a general historical materialist model along these lines, see Laibman, 1984; 1992, ch. 13 .
Their contribution depends on the possibility of their incorporation within a more rigorous theoretical structure. Identification of two juxtaposed theoretical stages is the basis for determination of the theorized transition between them. This point should be fairly obvious, and will be elaborated only later in connection with the model of Section II. A theorized transition is an explained transition, and this explanation precedes in order of importance the matter of dating SS identifying in chronological time the transitions in concrete history that correspond to the theorized transition under investigation. The point for the present is that the core necessities of the preceding stage provide the answer to the Awhy@ of the transition to the succeeding one.
b. Layered abstractions and successive concretization. The distinction between the abstract social totality, on the one hand, and concrete history, on the other, calls for elaboration. There are not just two useful levels of abstraction, for example, but several; this gives rise to the concepts of Alayered abstractions@ and Asuccessive concretization@ (Sweezy, 1956; dos Santos, 1970; Mavroudeas, 2004 ). Periodization at the abstract level, for example, is complicated (Aoverdetermined@) by a second periodization at the level of (relatively) concrete capitalist social formations. This rests on the variety imposed by differentiated geographical, climatic, and resource contexts for capitalist evolution, giving rise to uneven development, diffusion, conquest, and expansion. Uneven development is a major reason why theoretical stages are hard to Afind@ in the data, giving rise to interminable (and often unnecessary) debates about the Adating@ of transitions between stages . The dates are inherently uncertain, because the transitions are in fact Ablurred@ by different stages of development of capitalist societies that are nevertheless shaping one another through trade, colonization, foreign investment, and general cultural interchange. Theoretically well defined transitions between stages are only rarely found at precise locations in chronological time.
For present purposes a three-level model will be deployed. 7 First, of course, is the abstract capitalist totality, in which the social formation and mode of production coincide. To derive theoretical stages at this level, we must in effect imagine that capitalist evolution is taking place on a planet with only one continent; with a uniform natural environment in terms of temperature, rainfall, flora, fauna and soil; no internal waterways, narrow isthmuses, mountain ranges, or any other barriers that might create localized and isolated paths of 7 This is not a general commitment; additional levels may become useful later and in other connections. For a three-level approach to analysis of social classes, see dos Santos, 1970. 11 development. We, in short, abstract from uneven development and all that that implies.
The central organizing concept of Jared Diamond=s monumental work, Guns, Germs and Steel (Diamond, 1997) , geographical determinism, is thus relegated here to a secondary order of invocation, corresponding to a lower level of abstraction than that of the abstract social totality. To the extent that Diamond is concerned with the tens of thousands of years of pre-history, however, geographical differentiation is indeed the proper focus.
Even with this abstraction in place, short of full historical contingency (including the role of individual personalities) another level can be identified. Experience is absorbed into consciousness and embodied in institutions and cultures so as to generate agency on a significant scale, only over time, and sometimes over considerable stretches of time (Lembcke, 1991n92) . Marx wrestled with this problem in the 18th Brumaire (Marx, 1926) . In the first half of the 19th century, the underlying mode of production and class structure in France were not undergoing significant change. A political dynamic SS the restoration of the monarchy SS was nevertheless unfolding, and this produced the almost eery drive of the absolutist ghost to inhabit every republican form, leading to retrogressive stages in which restorationist forces took on various republican guises. On top of the stadiality of the underlying mode of production, therefore, lies an additional dynamic stemming from a long cycle of advance and retreat SS of the bourgeoisie in relation to the nobility and monarchy in 19th-century France, or SS an obvious extension SS of the working class in relation to capitalist power in the 20th century and up to the present.
This long cycle is essential to our understanding of the early 21st century. In the model of the next section, in fact, the second level SS uneven development SS will be compressed, with attention centered on theoretical stadiality at the top and the advance/retreat cycle at the bottom.
c. Capitalist diffusion. Capitalism spreads outward to areas where precapitalist relations prevail. This cannot be taken for granted. How capitalism emerges within, and eventually replaces, precapitalist relations is the heart of the theory of feudal-to-capitalist transition (Science & Society, 1977) , and that inquiry is the starting point for a theory of capitalist diffusion in general. Diffusion is the penetration of capitalism into previously noncapitalist (usually precapitalist) space. It must be distinguished from capitalist accumulation: the self-propelling and self-reproducing system of sale/purchase of labor power and appropriation of surplus value, in a space where capitalist class relations have already been established. Marxism has made much more progress with accumulation than with diffusion; this may be partly because Marx himself approached the former as a matter of theoretical interest in Capital, while the latter was confined mainly to historical description. Placing diffusion squarely in the realm of theory will help in establishing a sufficiently rigorous stadial framework.
II. ACCUMULATION, DIFFUSION, THE NATION AND THE STATE: A SYNTHESIS OF CAPITALIST PERIODIZATION
The stadial model can best be developed in connection with a diagram (Figure 1 ), which is a logical summary of the argument, and to which the reader should refer regularly while reading this section. The organizing principle of Figure 1 is a pair of cross-cutting distinctions: between capitalist diffusion and capitalist accumulation (along the vertical), and between internal and external fields of operation (along the horizontal). The internal/external distinction itself depends upon the evolutionary path; it only comes into existence during Transition I. In the upper left box of the diagram, therefore, Ainternal@ essentially coincides with Atotal.@
Stage I and Transition I
The story begins in the upper left box, which combines Adiffusion@ with Ainternal.@ While not synonymous with the common labels Amercantilism@ or Aprimitive accumulation,@ Stage I does draw upon those labels for content. 9 The precondition for the market to assume a dynamic, developmental quality SS as distinct from its ever-present passive externality in much of recorded history SS is the specific form of productive forces development in feudalism: the emergence of the individual surplus SS a surplus over subsistence needs in individual production SS as contrasted with the collective surplus of earlier epochs that grounded the original formation of exploiting classes. This surplus emerges, for necessary reasons, only within feudal (manorial) production, which combines small-scale class exploitation (the capture of the surplus) with relative autonomy for the direct producers and the associated incentive to innovate. This system, never embracing more than a minority of the population in the countries of feudal Western and Northern Europe (including, of course, Britain), was nevertheless the basis for intensive development of the productive forces, 10 and therefore the Ahothouse@ or incubator of the individual surplus. This surplus makes possible the expansion of trade in the late AMiddle Ages@ (Pirenne, 1939; Sweezy, 1977) ; trade thus loses the deus ex machina quality that it acquires in all manner of descriptive accounts (cf., on this, Wood, 1999) .
The transition to capitalism (Transition I) is both problematic and protracted. It requires accumulation of means of production in the hands of a minority ruling class whose wealth exists in valorized form, and the dispossession of the majority, transferring control over production away from the direct producers. The surplus available to finance coercive institutions (for colonization, enclosure, dispossession) is generated within archaic precapitalist relations, while the dynamic element, production for the market, generates an unstable and unreliable surplus (the core capitalist coercion mechanism, of course, has not yet been established). Merchants enforce relations of unequal exchange with direct producers through the putting-out system and through control over channels of trade, but 9
AInternal@ refers to the formation of home markets in countries experiencing transition to capitalism. External colonization, the looting of the Americas, the gold inflow, enslavement of African and American populations, etc. of course play a highly visible role in this period. The crucial dynamic, however, has to do with internal transformation, which determines the efficacy of external empire-building and international trade; thus, the Ainternal@ label. Only after nation-building is complete does the external come into focus.
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The distinction between intensive and extensive productive forces development is central to the model elaborated in Laibman, 1984; 1992, ch. 13 . they also confront a reduced but fortified feudal nobility (and promote absolute monarchies, which they come to control financially, for this purpose). In many parts of Europe, an equilibrium trap thus emerges, which, along with plagues, famine, etc., goes a long way toward explaining the centuries-long time frame for this transition.
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For a more detailed version of this condensed statement, see Laibman, 1992, ch. 13; Laibman, 1984 . For a critique, Carling, 2002 .
The emergence of capitalism, or capitalism-like features, in Stage I is a matter of diffusion SS of the slow spread of both commodity markets and wage labor into a sea of feudal and simple-market (peasant) production (admixed, perhaps, with still other precapitalist forms: despotic tribute, monastic landholdings, residual slavery, etc.). In this process, markets act as a solvent, dissolving long-existing cultural, linguistic and local-economy differentiations and gradually creating a wider social space within which people come to share a common identity. The practical need for uniform roads and waterway systems for transport, common weights and measures, shared practices regarding tolls, fines, local taxes, a generally accepted currency, etc., imposes progressive homogenization of social life. The original cultural entities, akin to tribes with small populations of people generally known to each other, are gradually merged into larger unities, and social identification shifts to these. In Britain, to take a case in point, the many warring cultural groups SS Angles, Saxons, Welsh, Celts, etc. SS slowly coalesce into Britons; the Norman invasion facilitates this unification process, and eventually there emerges the AEnglish,@ who face the French, Germans, Dutch, and so on. The question for theory is: Why does this process stop short of world unification? Why do nations SS the unities that take shape in the period of capitalist ascendancy as a result of Transition I SS solidify into permanent entities that continue to characterize global society in the 21st century?
The nations as we know them did not always exist. At the time of the French Revolution only about ten percent of the population of the territory we today call AFrance@ spoke a language recognizably close to the one we call AFrench@; this was the population surrounding the Paris region, and it would be reading history backwards indeed to simply assume that that language had to eventually dominate the entire region, in which scores of languages were spoken. Spain was not ASpain@; it was Alas Espa as,@ a loose amalgam of Basques, Catalans, Moors, etc. The question arises: What is it that arrests diffusion, resulting in definite territories each with a common language and culture? A water barrier, the English Channel, helps explain the formation of England and France; but all such formations cannot be explained in this way. In the homogenous environment of the abstract social totality, what would explain the break in the diffusionnunification process and the formation of the modern nations? An answer to this question will tell us something about the nature of capitalism itself.
For capitalist exploitation to become stably self-reproducing, the social space over which it occurs must be large enough for the newly forming proletariat to consist of abstract and interchangeable individuals, who must see themselves as such. Small-scale markets do not support this degree of abstraction. Capitalist proto-relations in small towns SS think of Acompany towns@ in the United States in the 19th century SS where everyone is known to everyone else and where the workers form an identifiable concrete group in relation to the employer, represent an early and insufficient form of capitalism. The conditions for valorization of labor power, as analyzed by Marx in Capital I, include creation of a socially uniform space sufficiently large so that the worker confronts capital entirely as an interchangeable and dispensable individual, and moreover confronts capital in general SS not just the capitalist owner of a particular production process or a particular sector of production. The worker is a worker-in-general, over the entire potential range of commodities; this is, of course, the formation of abstract labor.
Stage II begins at the point where immanent coercion based on abstract proletarianization becomes possible as the central mechanism for production and appropriation of surplus value. When this happens, and the process of capital accumulation filters into the experience of capitalists and workers alike, the old Aextra-economic@ coercive machineries that propelled the diffusion process in Stage I become insufficient and problematized. The state retreats from being an active player in accumulation and an active coercive force (both internally and externally) and adopts its classical, Aliberal@ form. Accumulation is capital spontaneously annexing surplus value and expanding, by taking on market (valorized) forms, without having to rely on the coercive power of the state financed by taxation or borrowing. This is when SS and why SS the state ceases to act as the motor of continued diffusion and cultural unification, and the nations Aharden@ into the form with which we are familiar.
Two observations are relevant here. First, a connection has been established between the classical, passive state and the modern nation; thus, the nationnstate. The condition of sufficient scale for the abstraction of both labor and capital is the qualitative basis for the distinction between the nation, in this sense, and similar entities in earlier periods (e.g., the citynstates of Mediterranean antiquity). Second, we now have a prime example of a theorized transition between a pair of theoretical stages, in which one clearly requires the other as prior foundation. It should go without saying that empirical historians, who are not looking for these qualities, will never find them; we learn, predictably, that the English state was never Apassive,@ that national sentiment long pre-dated the system of wage labor, etc.
Stage II and Transition II
Once the transition to spontaneous coercion within production and the associated hardening of the modern nations is complete, accumulation replaces diffusion as the central dynamic. Accumulation takes place within nationSstates, and the national/international, or internal/external, distinction becomes significant. This is Stage II, located in the Aaccumulation@S@internal@ box of Figure 1 , lower left. It is the experience from which Marx distilled the core concepts of his theory of capitalism=s nature and logic (Heilbroner, 1985) .
Just as the feudal manors served as incubator of the intensive surplus, so the nationSstates provide protected domains within which capitalism can grow in its classical form. The nationSstate becomes the locus of personal and cultural identification; this, together with the market fetishization of capitalist social relations, forms the hegemonic ideology that binds the working class to the system of its exploitation. The nation inhibits consciousness of class, which only emerges in times of crisis. AThe market@ is an elemental reality, operating on all social actors with the force of natural law. This, of course, is the key to the high degree of sophistication of capitalist exploitation, compared with its precapitalist counterparts.
Establishment of a social field sufficiently large so that valorization and abstraction of class can be accomplished is the basis for the predominance of spontaneous market relations as the principle guiding social reproduction, and the associated passivity of the state. In Stage II the behavior of the capitalist units of control (capitals, or firms) is most clearly parametric: capitals experience prices, including the price of labor power, as competition-determined parameters, outside of their direct control. The textbook economics concept of Aperfect competition@ is a pallid abstraction from this reality. The parametric quality, however, is always relative: capitalists in every period act strategically within a local framework, in competition with other capitals for growth and market share, and in conflict with workers at the point of production over the terms and conditions of purchase/sale of labor power and extraction of labor from it. Parametric domination appears as a continual override of individual capitalists= strategic choices by processes, such as price formation and the growth imperative, that appear as external compulsions corresponding to no-one=s conscious choice. This is the kernel of truth in the commonplace capitalist assertion, often made during negotiations with labor, that Awe are all bound by the laws of the market@ SS a real illusion that is part of the intricate machinery ensuring the reproduction of capitalist class structure and the accumulation process.
The immanent contradiction at the core of this regime is the subject of an enormous body of work going back to Capital I. Suffice it to say that the conditions for existence of capitalist exploitation SS an adequate rate of exploitation but one sufficiently low to enable realization (sale) of goods SS and the conditions for expansion of capitals SS an adequate rate of profit SS come into conflict. This contradiction, which incorporates the shaping of technology by capitalist imperatives but is by no means limited to that factor, intensifies as the system matures through Stage II.
12 One aspect of this process is growth in the size of capitalist units of control SS Marx=s concentration and centralization of capital. This growth undercuts the parametric valorization basis of Stage II, and paves the way for Transition II, in which internal accumulation is replaced by external diffusion (the upper-right box of Figure  I ).
Transition II captures the essential elements of the statenmonopoly conception. Strategic behavior was always admixed with parametric behavior; the sharp dichotomy between these two modes of functioning must, I think, be rejected. However, the relative submersion of the strategic aspect comes to an end when and as capitals grow to the point where a significant proportion of their activity has transcended national boundaries. A system of what can be called (for the first time) international trade emerges within Stage II. This signals that units of capital have grown to the point where they are able to influence and manipulate state power, and therefore to form strategic perspectives that incorporate the
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Further elaboration of this aspect of the theory will be found in Laibman, 1992 Laibman, , ch. 12 (1983 1997; 1999n2000. making of national political policy. Growth in the scale of production fosters the emergence of a world market. This market faces an immanent barrier: the hardened nation-states from Transition I and Stage II, which prevent further extension of state power in correspondence with the growing scale of economic relations. The outcome is Stage III: an epoch characterized by a growing contradiction between the transnational field of operation of capitals SS first trade, then investment, then finance SS and the limited and conflictual terrain on which state power is exercised. This international anarchy finds its expression in colonization, imperialism (Lenin=s Ahighest and last stage@), military rivalry and war. The general correspondence between Stage III and the 20th century should be clear.
With Transition II, the focus shifts back again from accumulation (always taking place, of course) to diffusion, now, however, centered on the external aspect: the spread of capitalist power, and then capitalist relations of production, to the as-yet non-capitalist areas of the world.
As noted above (in Section I), capitalist diffusion has not been theorized in a manner comparable to the existing body of work on capitalist accumulation. This gap cannot be overcome in one paper; following are some preliminary observations. First, it is reasonable to expect that the regime of diffusion in Stage III is internally contradictory, just as is the regime of accumulation in Stage II. Working out the theory of this contradiction is a task of central importance. The trajectory of this stage is clearly the formation of a world proletariat and self-propelling accumulation on a world, or transnational, scale; this is the substance of Transition III. Comparison of Stage I and Stage III is instructive. In Stage I, state military and financial power are used to conquer the internal social spaces for capitalist production relations. This, however, occurs long prior to the formation of large-scale strategically oriented units of capital, whose own imperative for survival/ growth/pre-dominance requires them to extract surplus from the subordinate populations at the highest possible rate. Put another way, in Stage I the size of the units of control of capital is still limited compared to the extent of the market, and this makes the market incentive available for transformation of the underlying production relations. The market, in effect, is able to act in its role of solvent of precapitalist relations, because the productive forces are (relatively) underdeveloped and the existing capitalist units of control do not dominate. The opposite, however, is true in Stage III, which relies on the extensive productive forces and state-level units of control (the transnational corporations) developed within Stage II. The contradiction of Stage III, then, is the inconsistency between the large scale of the capital that is attempting to penetrate, and the small scale and powerlessness of the actors in the precapitalist environment being penetrated. Stage III, therefore, reveals a crisis of capitalist diffusion, or diffusion crisis: a persistent failure to establish capitalist relations Aon the ground@ in most parts of the Athird world@ (which now includes major sections of the former Asecond world@). This is a point of considerable importance, and I will return to it in the next section.
Second, as our exploration of the model approaches more closely to the present, the layering of abstractions (explained in Section I) must be considered. As promised there, we will pass over the second level, involving geographic differentiation and uneven development, and move directly to the third level: the balance-of-forces cycle. In this regard, the 20th century represents not only a protracted, drawn-out implementation of Stage III due to the diffusion crisis; it also reflects what may be called the ASoviet interregnum@: the period of Soviet power between 1917 and 1989n91. The Russian Revolution and its aftermath SS including especially the Chinese Revolution of 1945S48 SS were a forward movement for the working class on a world scale, despite the underdeveloped conditions of that class and its conditions of existence in most of the places where the surge took place. This working-class offensive was compounded by the popular mobilization in the more-advanced capitalist countries during the Great Depression, and all of this constituted the up-phase (from the working-class viewpoint) in the balance-of-forces cycle. The consolidation of capitalist power after World War II and the emergence of deepening contradictions within the socialist-bloc countries signal the turn of the cycle in a downward direction, a phase that is still unfolding.
The upshot is that Stage III, generally characterized by international anarchy and protracted efforts at diffusion, can best be understood as divided into two phases: before and after the Soviet interregnum. Prior to 1917 we witness Stage III in its classic incarnation, as the rivalry of nationSstates that have been captured by the strategic interests of the capitalist centers within them and launched into the struggle for spheres of influence and empire that culminates in World War I. The interregnum is a qualitative shift, in which existence of a Second World outside of capitalist control causes a period of strategic alliance among the warring capitalist powers (the Cold War), and (ironically) serves to propitiate the diffusion of capitalist relations in the Third World. With the Soviet collapse, the second phase of Stage III appears: this is the contemporary Aglobalization@ phenomenon, and it brings into full light the inherent contradiction of this Stage: the vast size of the units of control, combined with their extension beyond the reach of the nationSstates, which alone have the capacity to transmit the influence of subaltern populations and of the more far-sighted elements in the ruling capitalist regimes. The result: unprecedented polarization, and stalling of the diffusion process. Transition III is thus a troubled and protracted one.
Stage IV
If Transition III can be accomplished, it will mean the emergence of capitalist accumulation on a world scale SS the junction of Aaccumulation@ and Aexternal@ in Figure 1 , lower right box SS which is, as will by now be clear, much more than a set of simultaneous national accumulation processes (a sort of Stage II without an external precapitalist environment). Stage IV would involve a global, passive state, an end to diffusion (which has essentially been completed), and an accumulation based, once again, on the inherent coercive force of valorized production under capitalist control. (It also essentially abolishes the internal/external distinction that was brought into existence by Transition I.) The possibility of Stage IV turns on whether a world state can ground a form of non-class identity SS in the absence of Aothers,@ the external alien element that motivates the Awe@ of national identity SS sufficient to maintain capitalist ideological hegemony. The role of valorization in fetishizing social relations and reproducing hegemony becomes more central in the absence of national division. While some form of the classic contradictions of capitalist accumulation, originally identified in Stage II, will persist, the role of Afree-market@ ideology becomes crucial. To the extent that national identity cannot be completely replaced, the existing crisispotentials within accumulation are supplemented by a Ahegemony crisis.@ This tendency of Stage IV to generate inadequate nationalnideological cover for capitalist exploitation SS a hole in the hegemony layer, so to speak SS is a major inherent contradiction. Within this conception, ATransition IV@ (not theorized in Figure 1 ) would be socialist revolution: at this point, capitalism indeed has nowhere else to go.
In closing this discussion, we return to our methodological theme: the requirements of a genuinely (theoretical) stadial model. The chain-linked property of the stages should be clear: at the level of the abstract totality of the capitalist epoch being described, each stage requires the previous one as foundation, and each bequeaths to the following one some essential condition for that stage to emerge. Stage IV, for example, requires the global state that transnational capitalist class theorists observe as immanent in the emerging world institutions (World Bank, IMF, etc.) (see, e.g., Robinson, 1996; Robinson and Harris, 2000) . That state cannot develop except on the basis of more-or-less universal capitalist relations on the ground SS the diffusion accomplished in Stage III. Stage III, in turn, requires the trans-statal capitals that can only result from the accumulation made possible by the passive state of Stage II. Putting to one side the intermingling of elements among capitalist social formations at different stages of development, we have a determinate stadial conception of capitalist evolution at the level of the abstract totality. This has been extracted from the complex history of social existence and transformation throughout the centuries of capitalist predominance, and is the organizing tool for serious thinking about the inner reality of that history SS including its appearance in our ultimate object of attention, the present moment.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR NOW: APPLYING THE STADIAL MODEL
TO THE CURRENT CONJUNCTURE Some commentators, as noted above, regard all stadial thinking as inherently conservative. I (obviously!) do not accept that view. Nevertheless, working out the stadial inner logic of the capitalist world economy is a clear invitation to ask about the objective requirements for transcending capitalism. It is an affirmation that the agents of social change in any period of history do not operate in a vacuum; do not Amake their history just as they please,@ to borrow a famous phrase (Marx, 1963, 15) . Nothing in the stadial approach denies the role of agency, organization and consciousness, or suggests that our will to move toward a society worthy of human potential must be thwarted by some sort of mysterious telos of history. Nevertheless, there are limits to what can be accomplished in any period, which point not to ultimate limitations on human progress but rather to the path that can be effective in moving each step forward. This problematic simply must be faced, unless we are to argue (not in the name of the Marxist tradition, surely?) that will-to-achieve is all, and anything is possible.
That said, and with reference to the model of Section II, I believe we are, at present, deeply embedded within a highly troubled Stage III. This means, concretely, that the capitalist conquest of the globe is highly incomplete. Capitalism has parts of Stage III, and all of Transition III and Stage IV still ahead of it; to that extent, and however compressed this evolution may turn out to be, terms like Amoribund@ and Aobsolescent@ applied to the world capitalist system are premature. 14 14 Cf., for an important example of a contrary argument, Amin, 2004. What does this imply for socialist transition? A principled democracy that can (eventually) replace the spontaneous market and overcome the alienation of social existence requires the historical development of a thoroughly abstract proletariat SS one that is, in its own core experience, the bearer of the most general human concerns. A worldwide working-class community will have transcended national, religious, ethnic, and other primal divisions, even as these traditions contribute texture and variety to a shared world culture. Capitalism produces this proletariat, its true gravedigger, only in Stage IV. Indeed, what it produces spontaneously is an alienated abstract proletariat; transcendence of alienation and the emergence of a principled, cooperative culture require the fullest development within capitalism of conscious struggle from the side of the working class (see Lebowitz, 2003 , for a full statement). From this perspective, the failure of the Soviet experience was not an inherent weakness in the planning and management systems in place, nor even a result of the authoritarian deformation as such. Rather, the basis for that deformation is the absence of a prior historical experience of civil society and universal identity, at the level of Stage IV rather than Stage II. Without that prior development, it is very difficult SS not impossible SS to replace the market with advanced forms of democracy, in such a way that these do not revert to an authoritarian bureaucratism and concentration of power that is essentially a reprise of precapitalist conditions. From this perspective, the standard capitalist ideological claim of a link between the market and personal freedom (Friedman, 1962) is valid, within the limited horizon of capitalist development pre-Stage IV. It becomes precisely invalid with the development of a universal proletariat that suffers from the most abstract exploitation possible, and therefore carries within it the principled universality of general human aspiration.
To evaluate these claims, we have the advantage of a deepening understanding of exactly what capitalism is, as a result of the stadial model, especially Transition I and Stage II. This is where political economy is essential to the project of grasping the present. To recapitulate: capitalist accumulation SS the successful internal motion of capital, as a sophisticated means of exploitation and class reproduction adequate to a relatively high level of productive forces development SS requires a social field large enough to sustain the abstract class identities that enable full valorization of labor power: complete and reliable fetishization and obscuring of class. This, in turn, permits the powerful coercive force of exploitation to work without external (state) support.
From this standpoint, full-fledged capitalism has been much more rare on the world stage than we customarily believe. Just as feudalism took root in one small region of the world (or perhaps two), and its key component, the manor, involved a minority of the population even in those regions, so has capitalism emerged on the ground in only a few parts of the world, and has had difficulty spreading (the Stage III diffusion crisis). To see this, we must not confuse diffusion of capitalist production relations with the global dominance of the transnational corporations (which is not being denied). The capitalist centers of course control world trade, and their products and images have penetrated everywhere; the famous T-shirt with the Coca Cola logo in Arabic is the best possible symbol of this. But ACoca Colanization@ is not synonymous with capitalism. Nor is the existence of capitalist enclaves in the Middle East, China, the rest of South and Southeast Asia, and elsewhere. Workers in the Chinese industrial zones (which cause the capitalist centers in the West so much concern) are not a capitalist proletariat; they are overwhelmingly based in rural, quasi-communal villages that still house the majority of China=s population, and still have property, family and wider kinship ties to those villages, undercutting the valorization of their labor power. The capitalist social space defining abstract individuals and abstract classes is not present. Similarly, oil workers in the Middle East SS historically the foundation for leftnsecular progressive politics in that region and the best available counterweight to monarchical despotism, on one side, and religious fanaticism, on the other SS are not abstract workers in a classical capitalist labor power market. They are identified in relation to a particular industry SS oil SS and not in relation to capitalist industry as such.
Even in Latin America, capitalist labor markets are often confined to the large enclaves represented by major cities such as Buenos Aires and Santiago. The surrounding countryside contains ambiguous social relations, with a large component of peasant agriculture. And in the former Soviet bloc, the emergent social formation is topped by a criminal oligarchy (AMafia@), whose wealth comes largely from theft of property build up in the Soviet years (see Kotz, 2001; Laibman, 2002) . It is not based on the exploitation of Afree@ wage labor SS let alone the wage labor system required for spontaneous valorization.
As noted above, the failure of capitalist diffusion in Stage III results from the combination of concentrated and centralized capital built up in Stage II with an exterior (Athird@) world in which the specific prerequisites for spontaneous spread of market relations SS the individual surplus stemming from intensive productive forces development SS are largely absent. To put this point in a nutshell: in large parts of today=s third world, capitalism must be imported; it cannot be ignited. This, together with the demise of the Soviet counterweight, is the source of the extreme and unprecedented polarization of income and wealth, both across countries and within them. This polarization has now become a threat to basic survival in the poorer areas of the world, especially in the Islamic regions of the Middle East, Central and South Asia and North Africa. (Sub-Saharan Africa is a different, and distinctively tragic, case.) The material base is thus present for an upsurge of Islamic fundamentalism, in a destructive and destabilizing form. 15 Combine this with modern technology and the legacy of U. S. imperialist instigation of religious fundamentalism as a weapon against the Soviet Union, and the road leading to September 11, 2001 is clear.
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It can be argued that Islam, in ironic contrast to the older religions, Judaism and Christianity, is in effect a precapitalist religion: it has never adapted to the existence of civil society or accommodated itself to the concept of general citizenship in a state that is separate from religious institutions and power. Given the rise and damaging potential of right-wing fundamentalist Christianity, however, it may be necessary to qualify this distinction.
A further implication for the present flows from the perspective sketched out here. The United States Imperium, however powerful it may seem at the moment, is in fact an anachronistic holdover from the Soviet interregnum. The bipolar Cold War required that the capitalist world produce an executive leader, and given the current phase in the cyclical rise and fall of centers of temporary dominance within the hierarchies of capitalist economic and political power, that role fell to the United States. Even before the demise of the USSR, many observers noted a contradiction between the economic decline of the United States relative to Europe and Japan, and its politicalSmilitary predominance (and role as reserve currency provider). Now, with the bipolar world a thing of the past, this contradiction is strengthening. U. S. dominance is subject to constant erosion, from the emergence of new centers of economic power, including those in East Asia, and from the growth of transnational capitalist power and interests, both private and political.
Turning to implications for the working-class and progressive movements around the globe, the main message is sobering. We used to say that the choice facing the world is Asocialism vs. barbarism@; in an ultimate sense, that is still true. Nevertheless, at the present moment, the choice may well be between Acapitalism and barbarism.@ We simple have to recognize that today=s capitalist class, unlike the bourgeoisie praised by Marx and Engels for Anestling everywhere, settling everywhere@ 150 years ago, is having difficulty shaping the world after its own image. We are in a crisis of capitalist expansion, not a crisis associated with the challenge of socialism. Capitalism is increasingly finding it difficult to do what it does best: spread outward. The consequences are increasingly dangerous, from the standpoint of basic social reproduction in many parts of the world, looming ecological deterioration, and increasing attacks on positions in social provisioning long held by the working classes and allied strata in many countries.
This boils down to a conclusion concerning political strategy. The progressive and revolutionary working-class movements have an interest in alliances with other social class forces to promote secular development, even when those alliances are led by capitalist interests and promote SS for the present SS development along capitalist lines. Broadly based secular development SS urbanization, basic medical provision, education, sanitation, housing support SS is exactly what, with incessant prodding by class struggle from below, capitalism classically was able to achieve (Stage II), but increasing is not able to provide in many parts of the world. When working-class and popular forces support capitalist secularization SS because that is what is possible at the moment SS while simultaneously protecting and advancing their own interests and power within that process, they help determine the nature of capitalist development and build the positive side of abstraction toward a universal humanity SS a major instance of Acombined development.@ It must be stressed that the stadial understanding does not posit a static or linear conception in which we must first accept the alienating universality of commodity status and only challenge that status after it has been established worldwide. This would be like the error of transferring the stadial determinacy found at the abstract totality level to the concrete terrain of socioeconomic formations. Rather, understanding the complexity and scale of the tasks still faced by capitalist world expansion provides the firmest foundation for moving beyond capitalist hegemony and priorities to posing the possibility of socialist transformation.
This may seem a distant hope in the present climate, but we should remember that the balance-of-forces cycle always turns, and will turn again in our favor, largely as a result of what we do in the present. Understanding the complexity and stadiality of the present, and accepting objective limitations on what can immediately be done, do not amount to giving up on long-term goals or mechanically relegating them to some distant future. To the contrary: they are a matter of acting realistically in the world as it is, so as to bring it to the point where new advances in social evolution are objectively possible SS sooner, rather than later.
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